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A PUBLIC POLICY OVERVIEW OF ELECTRONIC
FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS
William R. Weber*
Today the legal issues relating to electronic funds transfer systems
(EFTS) are being joined on many fronts, generating a substantial amount of
legislation, regulation and litigation at both the state and federal levels.1
Although specific legal problems associated with EFTS have been addressed
by a number of commentators, 2 a congressional perspective necessarily must
be broader. From this perspective, a "legal issue" is any issue of concern to
a lawmaking body. Since the business of Congress is to translate public
interest into public policy, any observations about recent efforts at legisla-
tion, regulation and litigation must take into account one fundamental
question: What is the appropriate role of government, particularly the
federal government, in the development of EFTS?
I. EFT DEVELOPMENT-A BRIEF HISTORY
Much of the legislation and litigation to date has been in response to
actions taken by the federal financial regulatory agencies, principally the
* A.B., 1965, J.D., 1968, University of Michigan; Member of the State Bar of
Michigan, the Florida Bar, and the District of Columbia Bar. Counsel, Subcommittee
on Financial Institutions, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United
States Senate.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Mr. James P. Ulwick of the Catholic
University Law Review for providing research, drafting and editorial assistance in the
preparation of this article. The author's views are entirely his own and do not necessar-
ily represent the views of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs or
of the Committee staff.
1. For discussion of state legislation, see notes 11-30 and accompanying text infra.
For discussion of federal legislation, see notes 83-96 and accompanying text intra.
For discussion of federal regulation, see notes 31-40 and accompanying text infra.
2. See, e.g., Symposium: Electronic Funds Transfer, 35 MD. L. REV. (1975); D.
Baker, Antitrust and Automated Banking, 90 BANKING L.J. 703 (1973); I. Baker, What
Ever Happened to the "Checkless Society?," 7 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 481 (1974); Brandel
& Gresham, Electronic Payments: Government Intervention or New Frontier for Pri-
vate Initiative?, 29 Bus. LAw. 1133 (1974); Comment, Customer-Bank Communica-
tion Terminals and the McFadden Act Definition of a "Branch Bank," 42 U. CHI. L.
REV. 362 (1975).
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Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and the
Comptroller of the Currency.
The first real government impetus toward the development of EFT came
in November of 1973, when the Federal Reserve Board of Governors made
public its proposed amendments to Regulation J, which governs the collec-
tion of checks through the Federal Reserve System.3 The Board stated that
it intended to place a high priority on developing an electronic substitute for
the nation's present payment system.4 The Board also broadly outlined the
system it favored and invited comment on its proposal and the underlying
policy issues. Essentially, it proposed to permit credit and debit transactions
between parties via the Fedwire system.5
Shortly after the Federal Reserve Board's proposal, the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) amended its regulations to allow federal
savings and loan associations to participate in both on-line and off-line
EFT systems. 6 The FHLBB prescribed certain regulations applicable to all
the federal savings and loan associations, 7 and a "pilot" program of a
point-of-sale (POS) system began in Lincoln, Nebraska. The quick success
of this program helped EFT move from the drafting board into the commu-
nity, and stimulated bank demands for parity with the savings and loan
associations.8
In response to national bank requests for authority to set up their own
EFT systems, the Comptroller of the Currency issued an interpretive ruling
in December, 1974. 9  The Comptroller declared that customer-bank
3. 38 Fed. Reg. 32952 (1973).
4. In setting forth its proposed system, the Board stated:
The context in which the proposed regulation is presented is set forth in the
Board's statement of policy issued on June 18, 1971 (57 Federal Reserve Bul-
letin, June 1971 at 546-47). In that statement the Board assigned a high pri-
ority to the improvement of the Nation's payments mechanism and to the de-
velopment of an electronic substitute for an overburdened check collection
system.
38 Fed. Reg. 32952 (1973).
5. See 38 Fed. Reg. 32952-57 (1973).
6. 12 C.F.R. § 545.4-2 (1975).
7. 39 Fed. Reg. 23991-93 (1974). Among the provisions prescribed by the FHLBB
are provisions relating to authorized financial services, access, confidentiality of account
information, consideration of competitive implications, and adequate security devices
and procedures.
8. See Supplemental Statement of First Federal Savings and Loan Association of
Lincoln, Nebraska, Hearings on Customer-Bank Communication Terminals before the
Comptroller 14-15 (1975).
9. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1974), as modified by 40 Fed. Reg. 21701 (1975). The
Comptroller's ruling described customer-bank communication terminals (CBCT's),
gave the Comptroller's version of the history and statutory background of the McFadden
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970), and went on to argue that CBCT's were not "branches"
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communication terminals (CBCT's) were not bank branches within the
meaning of the McFadden Act, which 'prohibits national bank branching
where state chartered banks are prohibited from branching by state law.10
The Comptroller's ruling thus attempted to avoid the problem of developing
an EFT system for national banks in states that have limited or unit
branching. However, the ruling has generated a storm of controversy, the
resolution of which will likely have a direct bearing on the ground rules for
future EFTS development.
II. STATE ACTION
The Comptroller's ruling, when coupled with the FHLBB's rulings author-
izing EFT experiments by federally chartered savings and loan associations,
gave a competitive edge in EFT systems development to federally chartered
deposit institutions. Naturally, state institutions were unwilling to stand still
while the federal institutions increased their advantage. It is, therefore, not
surprising that the vast majority of EFT-related statutes enacted by state
legislatures were enacted during 1975.11
The states have applied diverse approaches to EFTS regulation.'
2 If it
may fairly be assumed that the states have a common desire to preserve
competitive parity between federally and state chartered institutions, then it
is interesting to observe the different approaches employed. Some states
have incorporated fairly elaborate regulatory schemes in their EFTS ena-
bling legislation.' 3  Others have given more of a blanket endorsement to
within the federal definition of the word, and therefore were not subject to state
branching law. The Comptroller placed heavy emphasis on the physical differences be-
tween a branch bank and a CBCT and argued that competitive considerations mandated
the finding that CBCT's were not branches. 39 Fed. Reg. 44416-20 (1974).
10. 39 Fed. Reg. 44418-19 (1974). See notes 38-44 and accompanying text infra.
11. The two states which had spoken on EFTS prior to the Comptroller's ruling were
Massachusetts and Washington. Oregon also passed EFTS legislation in 1973, ORE.
REV. STAT. § 714.065 (1973), and amended it in 1975, ch. 193, § 2, Laws of Oregon
(1975). At this time, the states that have passed EFTS-related legislation are: Alabama,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah,
Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin.
12. See Prives, The Explosion of State Laws on Electronic Funds Transfer Systems:
Its Significance for Financial Institutions, Non-Financial Institutions, and Consumers,
Harvard University Program on Information Technologies and Public Policy (1976).
13. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 659.062 ,(Supp. 1975). The Florida statute includes
provisions relating to advance notice, mandatory access, limitations as to services, appli-
cability of branching law, considerations for the bank administrators to take into account
when deciding on an EFT application, safeguards, a mandatory yearly report by institu-
tions participating in EFT systems, and a fairly extensive definition of consumer rights.
1976]
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EFTS development. 14  Still others have banned EFTS development alto-
gether until after consideration of reports by newly established study com-
missions. 5
One popular approach has been the passage of "wild-card" legislation
whereby the state banking commissioner is granted whatever powers of
regulation are necessary to provide parity between federal and state institu-
tions.16 This development is particularly troublesome because it tends to
bypass local jurisdiction and may have substantial consequences for the
future development of the dual system of bank regulation and supervision
which exists today.
Wild-card statutes, on the other hand, are not to be confused with statutes
permitting a fair degree of regulatory flexibility, an important characteristic
of effective EFTS legislation. Two of the first states to enact EFTS
legislation, Massachusetts and Washington, have already seen their statutes
become somewhat obsolete because they deal only with automated teller
machines. 17 Manned point-of-sale facilities, for example, are not covered
by either state's legislation.
14. See, e.g., Va. Code 6.1-39.1 (Supp. 1976). The Virginia statute is limited to
an amendment to the Code of Virginia, stating that the State Corporation Commission
is given the authority to impose regulations, using as a standard the conditions, limita-
tions, and restrictions imposed by federal statute or by the Federal Reserve Board.
15. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-16-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975). The Utah statute spe-
cifically included a legislative finding
[t]hat the establishment and operation of such systems will have a substantial
impact upon the economy of this state and the depositors, customers and
shareholders of financial institutions operating under the laws of this state, and
may create competitive imbalance between state and federally chartered
financial institutions or between various types of financial institutions or
between financial institutions of this state and those based in financial centers
of the United States outside the State of Utah.
Id. § 7-16-1(3) (Supp. 1975).
16. The following states have passed EFT legislation which could be characterized
as wild-card legislation: Alabama, Louisiana, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia. Other
states have included in their more detailed legislation provisions which give the bank
regulator the power to allow state institutions to maintain EFT parity with federal insti-
tutions. See, e.g., Pub. Act No. 75-373 § 8, State of Connecticut Public and Special Acts
(1975). These wild-card statutes, however, are distinguishable from each other.
Some states, while giving the state regulatory agency power equivalent to the federal
agencies, have also attached specific guidelines. For example, North Dakota's EFT leg-
islation for banks, N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-02(8) (Interim Supp. 1975), could be char-
acterized as a wild-card statute, yet the statute mandates a number of specific require-
ments such as advance supervisory approval and compulsory sharing between banks.
The statute also explicitly allows preauthorized loans, withdrawals and deposits from
both manned and unmanned EFT systems. North Dakota has also passed special
EFT legislation pertaining only to the Bank of North Dakota.
17. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 167, § 65 (Supp. 1976); WASH. Rv. CODE ANN. §
30.43.010 et seq. (Supp. 1976).
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A number of states have passed legislation which contains specific guide-
lines for EFTS development. These include guidelines as to sharing,' 8 the
need for advance regulatory approval, 19 functions the EFT system may
serve,20 and consumer protection safeguards. 21  The relevance of these
statutes is suggested by a recent study released by the Program on Informa-
tion Technologies and Public Policy of Harvard University. 22 The author of
the study concludes:
To a large extent this legislation seems to have been developed in a
vacuum, but state EFT laws are now among the most extensive
legal pronouncements on the subject of EFT systems and, as such,
might be expected to influence the thinking of those who are devel-
oping EFT systems and those who are drafting EFT legislation
in other jurisdictions, state and federal. In short, state EFT laws
are filling the vacuum they were created in.
23
If the author is correct, then several observations are in order. First, only
a handful of states have made any attempt to establish specific guidelines
with respect to consumer protection in EFT systems.2 4  To the extent that
such matters as privacy and security have not been adequately addressed in
legislation, it may be increasingly difficult to add consumer protection
provisions after the basic EFTS enabling legislation is enacted. 25  An
additional concern is whether, in the absence of specific, legislated consumer
protection guidelines, adequate protection against abuses can be obtained
from regulation or litigation.
2 6
18. States which include provisions relating to sharing and access include: Connec-
ticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota and Washing-
ton.
19. Advanced supervisory approval for establishment of EFT systems is required by
Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey,
North Dakota, South Carolina, Washington and Wisconsin.
20. Such functions include accepting deposits, allowing withdrawals, dispensing pre-
authorized loans, and transferring amounts from savings accounts to checking ac-
counts.
21. These provisions are fairly rare. See Prives, supra note 12, at 54-61. Only Flor-
ida has included an extensive section on consumer rights. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 659.062
(13) (Supp. 1975). Iowa's statute also includes consumer related provisions. IowA
CODE ANN. § 524.1211 (Supp. 1975).
22. See Prives, supra note 12.
23. Id. at 2.
24. See note 21 supra.
25. See Statement of Jonathon Brown and Statement of Independent Bankers Asso-
ciation of America, Hearings on S. 245 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions
of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 89,
114 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 245].
26. See Statement of Jonathon Brown, Hearings on S. 245, at 89. Concern over ade-
1976]
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A second issue relates to the Uniform Commercial Code. Several com-
mentators have concluded that state law relating to the clearing of commer-
cial paper is not applicable to electronic funds transfer. 27 Thus, revisions in
the states' UCC law appear to be necessary.
A third issue relates to the development of EFT systems by nonfinancial
institutions. Generally, states have not addressed the issue of a non-
financial institution participating in EFT systems, 28 and whether it would be
regulated by state banking departments. It would seem anomalous to
prescribe one set of regulations for an EFT system run by a bank and
another for a comparable system run by a retailer. Thus, even though
public identification of the system would be with the nonfinancial institu-
tion, the system may very well be regulated by a banking agency.2 9
In addition to these considerations, EFT development must be considered
in light of the needs of an increasingly mobile and sophisticated population
moving freely within a national and even international financial market-
place. Notwithstanding the relevance of state law, one must wonder wheth-
er the wide diversity of state action alone gives rise to the need for a federal
balance.8
0
III. CONTRASTING FEDERAL APPROACHES: THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA
Numerous points of view have been expressed regarding the appropriate
degree of government involvement in EFTS development at the present time.
An interesting contrast of different political and philosophical approaches is
provided by comparing developments in the United States with the approach
adopted recently by Canada.
A. The United States' Approach-Pluralistic Growth of EFTS
The growth of EFT systems in the United States has received significant
government input. That input, however, has been the result of anything but
a cohesive, organized effort. Various federal regulatory agencies have
quate consumer protection guidelines is most often expressed in terms of privacy and
security of account information.
27. See, e.g., Ege, Electronic Funds Transfer: A Survey of Problems and Prospects
in 1975, 35 MD. L. REV. 3, 24 (1975).
28. See Prives, supra note 12, at 49.
29. Id.
30. Presently, a number of states have prohibited out-of-state entry of EFT devices.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 659.062(9) (Supp. 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 524:1207
(1) (Supp. 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1111(2) (Supp. 1975).
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joined the EFT stampede. The agencies' positions have represented a wide
spectrum of philosophical viewpoints within the federal government itself of
the proper development of EFT systems.
On one end of the spectrum, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the
Federal Reserve Board have proposed federally operated EFT systems. The
Federal Reserve Board's proposed system was drafted to speed up its
payments system between its member banks.3' The Board's original pro-
posal has been amended, in part in response to the comments and criticisms
leveled at it by the Department of Justice and others.82  The Board's
proposed plan basically outlines the contours of a federally operated auto-
mated clearing house (ACH).83 Some critics of this system have argued
such a federal system would constitute a de facto preemption of the ACH
field. 34
Similarly, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board has stated its intent to
implement a pilot switching system.3 5  This system has been characterized
by the Justice Department as performing substantially the same functions as
the systems that the private sector has developed.36  The Department
also noted that the Bank Board's system differed from the one proposed by
the Federal Reserve in that the Federal Reserve regards the transmission of
information as ancillary to its primary purpose of clearing funds among
member banks, while the clearing proposed by the Bank Board is provided
essentially as a service that the Bank Board would like to provide for its
members.3
7
The administrator of the national banks, the Comptroller of the Currency,
has been the government EFT lightning rod of late. Burdened by the
31. 38 Fed. Reg. 32952 (1973).
32. See Comments of the United States Department of Justice in the Matter of Pro-
posed Policy on Access to Federal Reserve Clearing and Settlement Facilities, Nov.
20, 1975.
33. See 41 Fed. Reg. 3098 (1976). The present rights and liabilities of parties using
the Federal Reserve system are governed by a conglomerate of agreements and con-
tracts which lack a common structure. The Board's planned system outlines the duties
and liabilities of a Reserve bank, and details the system of credit and debit transfers
via the network.
34. See Comments of Department of Justice, supra note 32. See also Hock, EFTS
or EVE, in THE ECONOMICS OF A NATIONAL ELECTRONIC FuNDs TIANSFER SYSTEM 65,
78 (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference Series No. 13, 1974).
35. See Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Qualified Vendors Sought to Assist the
FHLBB System and their Member Institutions in the Development of an Electronic
Funds Transfer Switch Capability (1975).
36. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Thomas Kauper to Garth Marston, Act-
ing Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Oct. 16, 1973,
37. 1N.
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McFadden Act3 8 and consequent national bank subservience to state law,3 9
and faced with competition from the thrift institutions,40 the Comptroller
issued his now famous "interpretive ruling" declaring EFT devices to be
outside the perimeters of "branch banks" within the meaning of federal and
state law. 41 The Comptroller's legal arguments met with mixed success in
the courts. 42  Unfortunately for national banks, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia declared the Comptroller's ruling to be
"without merit"43 and the Comptroller was forced to suspend his ruling.44
Thus, national banks' current attempts to implement EFT systems have been
stymied, at least on a federal basis.
At the other end of the spectrum, the Justice Department has perhaps
taken the lead in advocating a "hands-off" approach with regard to govern-
ment involvement in EFT in its present stage of development. 43  The
Department criticized Congress in 1975 for its attempts to enact temporary
EFTS legislation, 46 and has consistently criticized the Federal Reserve
Board's proposed amendments to Regulation J. 47 It also strongly criticized
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's attempt to implement a pilot switch-
ing system accessible to savings and loan associations. 48 In this latter
criticism, the Justice Department had the support of the Chairman of the
38. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970).
39. The McFadden Act was passed in 1927. It provided that national banks, with
the approval of the Comptroller of the Currercy, could establish branch banks to the
extent that state banks were allowed to branch. Since national banks had no statutory
authorization to branch, the Act was basically in response to the competitive disad-
vantage national banks had been placed under by state banks which were allowed to
branch. See Comment, Electronic Funds Transfer and Branch Banking-The Applica-
tion of Old Law to New Technology, 35 MD. L. REV. 88 (1975).
40. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has no statutory equivalent to the McFad-
den Act. Thus, FHLBB establishment of EFT systems could be accomplished simply
by amending their own regulations. See 39 Fed. Reg. 23991 (1974).
41. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1975), as modified by 40 Fed. Reg. 21701 (1975).
42. Cases dealing with EFT and the McFadden Act include: State ex rel. State
Banking Bd. v. Bank of Okla., 409 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Okla. 1975); Independent Bankers
Ass'n v. Smith, 402 F. Supp. 207 (D.D.C. 1975); Bloomfield Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n
v. American Community Stores Corp., 396 F. Supp. 384 (D. Neb. 1975); State v. First
Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979 (D. Colo. 1975); State ex rel. Meyer v. American Com-
munity Stores Corp., 192 Neb. 634, 228 N.W.2d 299 (1975).
43. Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 402 F. Supp. 207, 209 (D.D.C. 1975).
44. 40 Fed. Reg. 49077 (1975).
45. See generally Baker, Competition, Monopoly, and Electronic Banking, in THE
ECONOMICS OF A NATIONAL ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEM 47 (Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston Conference Series No. 13, 1974).
46. See Statement of Donald Baker, Hearings on S. 245, supra note 25, at 104.
47. See Comments of the Department of Justice, supra note 32.
48. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Thomas Kauper to Garth Marston, supra
note 36.
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Senate Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, Senator Thomas J. McIntyre.
In a letter to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Senator McIntyre
concurred with the Justice Department's position that
the Bank Board's proposed switching systems appear to perform
substantially the same functions as do the systems the private
sector has developed .... The EFT industry is still in its infancy.
Its development is very sensitive to policy determinations made by
the Bank Board, and other regulatory bodies. The mere presence
of the Home Loan Banks as competitors may deter private busi-
nessmen from risking their capital-they may fear that the govern-
ment agencies might soon pre-empt the field, either by pricing
their service without regard for costs or by imposing an unduly
strict regulatory scheme on private competitive systems in order
to encourage use of government operated ones.
49
In its comments to the Federal Reserve Board on Regulation J, the Justice
Department observed that private efforts to promote EFT capability could
be significantly injured by efforts to develop a government operated EFT
system. They specifically objected to the system proposed by the Board,
stating that "the mere presence of the Federal Reserve in the field of
electronic clearing raises substantial questions of competitive impact."5 0
The Justice Department's opposition to government participation in EFT
growth stems from the Department's faith in the free market system. The
Department believes that competition provides incentives for maximum
effective utilization of present systems and for development of better sys-
tems. "' A competitive market, the Department contends, will encourage
entrepreneurs to invest in innovative and aggressive systems and their
operators.
Thus, the Justice Department argues that government intervention
amounts to a "freezing" of the industry for several reasons. First, if there is
a prospect of government intervention, investors are less likely to risk capital
in developing EFT systems, since the government system would probably be
more comprehensive and less expensive. 52  Secondly, private businessmen
may also fear unduly strict regulation of private competition designed to
encourage participation in the government systems.55 Finally, the Justice
Department has argued, better policy would seem to indicate that the
49. Letter from Senator Thomas J. McIntyre to Garth Marston, Acting Chairman of
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Nov. 7, 195.
50. Comments of the Department of Justice, supra note 32, at 6.
51. Id. at 106.
52. See Comments of the Department of Justice, supra note 32.
53. Id.
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regulatory agencies should maintain a flexible monitoring system of EFT
development, allowing day-to-day decisions to be made by the marketplace.
The Department concludes that excessive government control at these
preliminary stages is premature, and that a comprehensive system of regula-
tion would have to be based on speculation at this point.
54
B. The Canadian Approach-Unified Development of EFTS
In contrast to the diverse approach of the various United States federal
agencies, the Canadian government has adopted a more comprehensive
approach to EFT systems management. In a recent policy paper on
computer communications and the payments system, 55 the Finance and
Communications Ministers outlined three basic objectives of federal govern-
ment policy. Recognizing that the evolution of EFTS will greatly affect the
day-to-day transactions of individual consumers, the Ministers stated that the
government must protect consumer rights, particularly the right of privacy,
foster competition among financial institutions, and ensure maximum efficien-
cy in the payments system.5 6 The paper concluded that these objectives
could best be met by the establishment of a standardized, nationwide
telecommunications system entitled a "common user communications net-
work."15 7 The system is to be available for sharing by all qualified users,
bank and non-bank, on a fee-for-use basis. 58
In acting as it did, the Canadian government addressed the public interest
implications of choosing between a payments system involving a number of
private communications systems and one involving the common use of a
standardized communications network. 50
These public interest implications included communications costs, which
are of particular concern to small, outlying financial institutions,6 0 since the
54. Id.
55. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, TOWARDS AN ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS SYSTEM (1975)
[hereinafter cited as CANADIAN POLICY PAPER]. For a more in-depth discussion of EFTS
and the Canadian system, see Eddy, The Canadian Payment System and the Computer:
Issues for Law Reform, Administrative Law Project of the Law Reform Commission of
Canada (1974).
56. CANADIAN POLICY PAPER, supra note 55, at 6.
57. Id. at 7. The conclusion was based on the recommendations of the Working
Group of the Interdepartmental Committee on Computer/Communications. The Work-
ing Group was established by the Canadian government subsequent to the publishing of
a "Green Paper." See Eddy, supra note 55, at 54.
58. The paper additionally implied that this system would be Uhe only EFT system
permitted to deal with payment transactions. CANADIAN POLICY PAPER, supra note 55,
at 7.
59. Id. at 10-25.
60. Id. at 16.
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large fixed costs associated with private communications systems covering a
large geographical area constitute a potential barrier to the entry of new
competitors. The report was also concerned about smaller institutions
having to rely upon large, competing institutions for provision of an essential
service. 61 Consideration was given to the extent to which competitive
financial services would be reasonably available in all areas of the country.
The report concluded that a national network would offer greater efficiencies
than a series of private systems, particularly in remote and less populated
areas.6 2 The report suggested that a common, standardized network would
contribute to greater innovation between and among financial institutions,
and would facilitate future application to nonbanking areas where the
present incentive for development is not as great.63
An additional consideration involved the potential difficulties of inter-
changing the hardware and software of different manufacturers. 64  To the
extent that a common network would require interface of the equipment of
all suppliers, this would tend to relieve users of the burden of any potential
wholesale equipment changeovers by a private system. Notwithstanding the
preference for a common delivery system, however, the Canadian govern-
ment did not preclude the use by individual institutions of private systems for
purposes that are entirely internal to the institutions and unrelated to pay-
ments transactions. 6
5
The establishment of a common network, of course, requires the develop-
ment of appropriate standards for the system. To facilitate this, the
government established the Implementation Committee, composed of repre-
sentatives from common carriers, computer manufacturers, deposit-taking
institutions, retailers, and others as required. 66
61. Id.
62. Id. at 18.
63. An example of such innovation suggested by the paper was the direct deposit of
employees' checks into their bank accounts by large organizations. Id. at 13. Such a
system has already been suggested by the United States Treasury Department for trans-
mission of social security checks.
64. Id. at 17-18. The paper cited several specific industrial development advantages
that the common user communications network would have. Since the proposed commu-
nication processing is to be provided by Canadian common carriers, it will provide a
growth potential for the Canadian computer/communications industry. In addition, if
a standardized interface is adopted, different suppliers could produce the same equip-
ment, increasing competition to the benefit of all users. Finally, computer service and
systems development companies, as well as Canadian computer users, would benefit.
Id. at 18-19.
65. Id. at 18-19.
66. Id. at 20-21.
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Perhaps most significant of all, the Canadian government responded to the
concern that ad hoc development of private competing networks would
ultimately impair competition in the financial system. For example, it was
pointed out that financial institutions were, at that time, unsure of the extent
to which their own systems would ultimately have to be compatible with
either a national network or with the systems of other institutions. 7 This
uncertainty would make present planning difficult and would inhibit EFT
development. A common network would resolve uncertainty to a large
extent and permit long-range planning decisions to go forward.
In the absence of government initiative, however, it was deemed unlikely
that financial institutions acting in their own self-interest would support a
common network. Institutions would naturally be reluctant to exchange
internal information concerning customer services to the degree necessary for
development of appropriate standards. In the absence of standards, inter-
face between developing systems would be improbable.68 In addition, in
order for a common system to be cost efficient, a large number of financial
institutions must participate. Their willingness to do so would be inhibited if
there were a risk that others would not participate in sufficient numbers to
enable the network to achieve its full potential.69
The Canadian policy paper went on to recognize the influence that EFTS
will have on commercial practices and therefore on the necessary legal
framework for the consumer.70 Of particular note, in addition to privacy,
was the concern that consumers maintain the ability conveniently to switch
their accounts from one institution or retailer to another, a traditional first
line of defense for consumer rights. 71 The Canadian Justice Department
was given the leadership role in providing the government's response to the
67. Id. at 15. The Canadian paper stated that this was an immediate consideration
because planning and implementation cycles required purchase decisions for new genera-
tions of computer hardware to be made now. Therefore, the paper stated that "[i]t is
incumbent upon the government to examine the impact of possible alternatives on the
public interest." Id.
68. Id.
69. Although the paper made no specific suggestions, it did state:
A number of practical problems will arise in applying the existing legal frame-
work to an increasing electronic payments system. Current paper-based pay-
ments instrument law (Bills of Exchange Act) is an inadequate framework for
determining such things as when payment has legally been made. Further-
more, operating procedures of a more electronic payments system must pro-
vide a form of auditing for financial control and evidence in case of litigation,
which are at least as useful as those in the current paper-based system.
Id. at 24. These comments are analogous to those of commentators advocating the re-
visal of the UCC to accommodate electronic payments. See Ege, Supra note 27.
70. CANADIAN POLICY PAPER, supra note 55, at 24.
71. Id. at 25.
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legal and consumer issues raised by EFTS development. 72 This delegation
of authority is interesting in light of the contrast between the Canadian
proposals and the viewpoints already expressed by our own Justice Depart-
ment.
The United States Justice Department's basic premise is that competition
should be a goal in itself, and will produce the best EFT systems. 73 In
Canada, the government was concerned that the ad hoc development of
private networks would ultimately impair competition in the financial system.
The Canadian model may not be entirely applicable to the United States
since the Canadian banking system is much more concentrated than the
United States' system.74 Yet the public policy issues Canada addresses are
certainly valid. The United States Justice Department, on the other hand,
has a tendency to look at EFTS solely from an antitrust perspective. It is
possible, therefore, that were the Canadian policy to be initiated in this
country, it would be construed as a threat to competition and, indeed, a
freezing of private initiative.7 5  In any event, it is fairly clear that a
comprehensive system of regulation is not in the political cards at the present
time in the United States.7 6 Therefore, we are at least implicitly endorsing
72. Id. at 26. The Department was encouraged to consult with all interested par-
ties to the proposed network.
73. See Hearings on S. 245, supra note 25, at 106.
74. See, e.g., Eddy, supra note 55.
75. See Comments of the Department of Justice, supra note 32.
76. Although Congress did pass an EFT bill, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2401-08 (Supp. V, 1975),
it merely created a National Commission for the Study of EFT. See notes 83-86 and
accompanying text infra for a discussion of the Commission.
Two other bills have been considered and rejected. The Electronic Funds Transfer
Moratorium Act of 1975, S. 245, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), was introduced by Sena-
tor William Proxmire. The Act was designed to halt all EFT development for a period
of two years. It prohibited all financial institutions from entering into any contract
which would involve electronic methods of funds transfer. Regulatory agencies were
similarly prohibited from authorizing any EFT activity. The main rationale advanced
was that in the absence of a legislated moratorium, Congress would be faced with a fait
accompli: the National Commission's report would become a "sterile document," pre-
empted by existing structures. See Supplementary Statement of Independent Bankers
Association of America, Hearings on S. 245, supra note 25, at 137-38, 144 (1975).
Thereafter, the Electronic Funds Transfer Control Act of 1975, S. 1899, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (197,5), was introduced by Senator Thomas J. McIntyre, as a substitute for S.
245. S. 1899 prohibited interstate deployment of EFT facilities unless specifically au-
thorized by the states involved. The bill allowed intrastate deployment of EFT facilities
subject to the approval of the appropriate federal agency. Section 3 also stated that if
a state had passed an EFT law, and it created safeguards or geographical limitations
that were stricter than those contained in S. 1899, those state provisions would apply
to federal institutions headquartered in the state. In the absence of state regulation, a
minimum amount of federal regulation would apply. The federal agencies were directed
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the development of competing private systems. This laissez-faire approach,
however, does raise a public policy observation relating to the advent of the
debit card.
C. Different Approaches-Bankcards and EFT
In addition to addressing the interfacing problems of a common users
communication network, the Canadian policy paper focused on the transition
of traditional credit card systems into credit/debit card systems, recognizing
that if this type of card becomes an important means of payment, the
relationship of various types of financial institutions to generally acceptable
credit card systems has important competitive implications. 77 The paper
observed that the economies of credit card issuers and merchants, combined
with a consumer preference for a smaller number of cards, will likely result
in the survival of only a small number of generally acceptable credit card
systems. in Canada. 78 Thus, the policy advocated by Canada is an integra-
tion of the credit or credit/payment cards into the common user communica-
tions network.
79
In contrast, the United States has no comprehensive program in prepara-
tion for credit/debit cards. The major credit card systems, which operate
almost entirely outside of federal or state regulation, 0 already have sophisti-
cated nationwide electronic networks in place.8 ' For example, National
to consider competitive effects, security, privacy, confidentiality and other safeguards in
considering applications for EFT facilities.
Later, a modified bill, Amendment No. 602 to S. 1899, was offered as a substitute
for both S. 245 and S. 1899 but was defeated in the Banking Committee on July 9, 1975,
by a vote of 9-4.
77. See CANADIAN POLICY PAPER, supra note 55, at 22-23.
78. Id. at 22.
79. The paper stated:
The generally acceptable credit card or some similar card will probably evolve
into a machine-readable credit/payment card which will provide public access
to the electronic payments system through such devices as credit authorization
terminals, point-of-sale terminals and automated cash dispensers. Such devices
are already being used to a limited extent in Canada. Evolution in this direc-
tion raises two standardization considerations: standards to allow a card-read-
ing device to communicate with a remote computer over a common user com-
munications network and standards for the machine-readable card itself.
Id. at 22-23. The paper additionally noted that credit cards are part of internationally
acceptable credit card systems. The Canadian government therefore advocated a system
of monitoring international developments likely to affect Canadian needs. Id. at 23.
80. The only laws mainly applicable to credit cards are the Truth in Lending Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1970), and state laws on permissible interest rates, descrip-
tive billing and the like.
81. See Hock, supra note 34, at 72-73.
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BankAmericard, Inc. has established electronic data processing centers as
switches for the clearing of its commerical paper, brought into member banks
by merchants, back to the banks issuing the cards for billing to the
consumer.82 The advent of the debit card as a non-credit payment instru-
ment raises the prospect of the nationwide franchising of a private EFTS
by the credit card giants. Thus, if EFTS development is left to the private
marketplace, it seems valid to ask whether this will indeed result in a
proliferation of competitive systems or whether it will simply encourage a
monopoly by those systems already well entrenched.
IV. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS
Congress expressed its interest in EFTS in 1974 by creating the National
Commission on Electronic Funds Transfer. 83  The saga of the EFTS
Commission is almost legendary. A 16-month delay and one legislated
time extension heralded an inauspicious beginning. Whether the Commis-
sion will still be able to serve the purposes for which it was created depends
to a large extent on several basic considerations. The first is whether the
Commissioners will use the forum merely to advocate their own special
interests, (evidence of which is already apparent in the Federal Reserve
Board's attempt to secure immediate Commission approval of its controver-
sial proposals on Regulation J),84 or whether they will take off their
respective special interest hats and lend their collective expertise to an
objective analytical and investigatory effort. Second, with 26 Commission
members, the staff will be required to synthesize a great deal of divergent
opinion. Many of the Commissioners have superb staff backup and it
will be an enormous undertaking to keep all of these forces moving in
a common direction and on schedule. Third, and perhaps most important,
the Commission must be sensitive to the problems faced by Congress in its
attempts to translate the public interest into public policy. There will,
therefore, be no purpose served in telling the Congress more than it ever
wanted to know about technology. The question that Congress has asked
and the question it wants answered is: What specific public policy objectives
require federal legislative or regulatory action?
It has been suggested that public opinion, and industry opinion in
particular, has already discounted the Commission's efforts. 85 Nevertheless,
82. NATIONAL BANKAMERICARD INC., FACrS ABouT BANKAMERICARD (1975).
83. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2401-08 (Supp. V, 1975).
84. See EFT Commission Rebuffs Mitchell's Pleas for Comment on Proposed
Changes to Regulation J, American Banker, Mar. 15, 1967, at 1.
85. See Competition Sharpest Issue in EFT, American Banker, Jun. 20, 1975, at 1.
19761
Catholic University Law Review
if the above considerations are met, the Commission should regain whatever
credibility it may have lost and, indeed, achieve its purpose.
There are, in addition, a number of other areas in which current develop-
ments directly affect the mandate of the Commission. The Privacy Protec-
tion Study Commission"6 is a prime example. Even more significant,
however, are developments already underway in the Congress itself. At this
moment, there is more financial reform legislation pending before Congress
than at any other time in recent memory. The Senate, in December 1975,
passed the Financial Institutions Act.87  This Act represents the most
comprehensive restructuring of American financial institutions in over 40
years. In the House, the proposed Financial Reform Act88 not only
includes most of the Financial Institutions Act but also provides for a
massive overhaul of the present financial regulatory system, a restructuring
of the Federal Reserve System, and many other measures running the gamut
of bank structure to regulation. Many of these issues are being considered
individually by the Senate as well.8 9
The significance of these measures to EFTS can perhaps best be summed
up in one word: competition. Whether or not any or all of the proposed
legislation will eventually be enacted, the message is clear that Congress
is moving in the direction of more competition on many levels within the
financial community. This is evidenced by the fact that the Financial In-
stitutions Act passed the Senate by a vote of 79-14.90 It is also highlighted
by the fact that NOW accounts are currently permitted, not just in Massa-
chusetts and New Hampshire, but throughout New England.91
86. See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L No. 93-579, § 5, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974).
87. S. 1267, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See also S. REP. No. 94-487, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975); Hearings on S. 2591 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
(1973 & 1974).
88. H.R. 13,077, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). See CCH FED. BANIUNG L. REP. No.
580 (November 13, 1975) and No. 593 (February 13, 1976).
89. See, e.g., S. 2298, S. 2285, S. 2509 and S. 958, 94th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess.
(1975 & 1976).
90. 121 CONG. Rac. 21,836-37 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1975).
91. State Taxation of Depositories Act, Pub. L. No. 94-222, 90 Stat. 197 (1976),
amending 12 U.S.C. § 1832 (Supp. IV, 1974). Negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW)
accounts essentially are "checking accounts" which also pay interest or dividends. NOW
accounts were first introduced in 1970 in several Massachusetts savings banks. By 1973,
numerous financial institutions in both Massachusetts and New Hampshire were offering
them. In a compromise between prohibiting or sanctioning NOW accounts on a na-
tional scale, Congress passed an act which prohibited NOW accounts in all states except
Massachusetts and New Hampshire. See CONF. REP. No. 93-418, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973).
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A year ago, arguments against any EFTS moratorium legislation stressed
that the EFTS Commission should not operate in a vacuum. 92 Clearly, it is
not. The Senate Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, under Senator
McIntyre's chairmanship, has begun a broad inquiry into federal branch-
ing policy.93 This study is becoming increasingly significant in light of
litigation over whether EFT devices are branches for purposes of the Mc-
Fadden Act. 94 The Subcommittee will be studying the history and back-
ground of the McFadden Act, the relationship of branching policy to the
safety and soundness of our financial system, the relationship between
bank structure and competition, including the ability of financial institu-
tions to serve the public in terms of cost and services, the impact of branch-
ing restrictions on -the availability of credit in smaller communities and
rural areas, the relationship of branching laws to off-premises electronic
banking facilities, and the relationship of federal branching policy to the dual
banking system.95 While Senator McIntyre has indicated that he is launch-
ing this study with no preconceptions of what the outcome should be, 96 it is
clear that the result of the study will have a profound impact on future
thinking about the role of geographic restraints on the availability of
financial services.
V. CONCLUSION
The appropriate role of government, particularly the federal government,
in the development of EFTS will derive from the resolution of a basic
consideration: should private enterprise and marketplace considerations
dictate EFTS development, or is government participation necessary in the
interest of an orderly transition and protection of the rights of the parties
involved? This is certainly a fundamental issue in the dispute between the
Department of Justice, the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board. This issue is also the focus for the difference. in attitudes
currently prevailing in the United States and Canada. Its relevance to
future developments within the EFTS marketplace remains- to be deter-
mined.
At the present time, Congress is adopting a passive role while awaiting the
reports of the National Commission on Electronic Funds Transfer. Eventu-
92. Hearings on S. 245, supra note 25.
93. See generally 121 CoNo. REc. 22,321-27 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1975) (remarks of
Senator Thomas J. McIntyre).
94. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970). See Comment, supra note 39.
95. See 121 CONG. REC. 22,321-27 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1975).
96. Id.
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ally, Congress will likely be the arbiter of many EFTS issues, particularly
those relating to consumer protection, regulation of financial services offered
by both bank and non-bank competitors, and federal branching policy.
Indeed, EFTS represents an affront to a number of traditional distinctions,
including those that have distinguished commerical banks from thrift institu-
tions, banking from non-banking services, and geographic restraints embod-
ied in our dual system of chartering and supervising financial institutions.
As Congress attempts to formulate EFTS policy, the perception of what
constitutes the public interest must be a dynamic one taking into account the
recommendations of the National Commission on Electronic Funds Transfer
and developments both within the private marketplace and those currently
underway within the Congress itself.
